Distributed Storage with Strong Data Integrity based on Blockchain Mechanisms by Nygaard, Racin










Title of master's thesis:
Credits:
Keywords:
Number of pages: 103
+ supplemental material/other: 
Code included in PDF
Stavanger, June 15, 2018
Title page for Master's Thesis 
Faculty of Science and Technology 
Racin W. Nygaard
Computer Science





Distributed Storage with Strong Data Integrity based on Blockchain Mechanisms

Distributed Storage with Strong Data




A blockchain is a datastructure that is an append-only chain of blocks. Each
block contains a set of transaction and has a cryptographic link back to
its predecessor. The cryptographic link serves to protect the integrity of
the blockchain. A key property of blockchain systems is that it allows mu-
tually distrusting entities to reach consensus over a unique order in which
transactions are appended. The most common usage of blockchains is in
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.
In this thesis we use blockchain technology to design a scalable architec-
ture for a storage system that can provide strong data integrity and ensure the
permanent availability of the data. We study recent literature in blockchain
and cryptography to identify the desired characteristics of such a system. In
comparison to similar systems, we are able to gain increased performance by
designing ours around a permissioned blockchain, allowing only a predefined
set of nodes to write to the ledger. A prototype of the system is built on top
of existing open-source software. An experimental evaluation using different
quorum sizes of the prototype is also presented.
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The introduction of Bitcoin and its continuous coverage in mainstream me-
dia has brought a lot of attention to the underlying technology, blockchains.
Blockchains are viewed as being a driving force for innovation in the mod-
ern digital society. There is on-going work in several areas for the use of
blockchains, such as the financial market, electronic voting, tracking data
provenance in clinical trials, data storage and many others.
A blockchain is an append-only distributed ledger of transactions, whose
structure is kept resilient through the use of cryptographic primitives. Thus,
the study of a blockchain system is an interdisciplinary endeavor, involv-
ing key concepts from mainly cryptography and distributed systems. The
strength of the technology is more apparent when used in a distributed fash-
ion, where it allows consensus to be reached between parties that do not trust
one another. Much of the research on blockchains is focused on the consensus
mechanisms. These range from the rediscovery of algorithms such as in the
case of proof-of-work, to more traditional methods such as Byzantine fault
tolerance, and even new novel methods such as proof-of-space/time. The
choice of consensus mechanism is perhaps the most important element when
considering a blockchain based system. Due to each mechanism offering dif-
ferent properties, it is necessary to carefully consider the specific intended
application before making a choice.
An interesting use case for blockchains is to support a storage network of
mutually distrusting entities. Key properties of a reliable storage system are
scalability, reliability, throughput and availability. By using a blockchain to
keep track of the stored data, additional properties such as verifiability of the
data stored and linked timestamping [1, 3] can be gained. These properties
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combined with cryptographic primitives will give the end-user the power to
verify data authenticity and provide confidence in the permanent availability
of the stored data.
The overall aim for this thesis is to design a highly scalable architecture
for a storage system built on blockchain technology that requires strong data
integrity. We foresee our system most suitable for applications which require
public verifiability. Example applications include health journals, business
contracts, scientific data and patents. To this end, we study recent literature
in order to identify and classify the characteristics needed for the system. In
our literature study, we identify three similar systems that rely on a publicly
available ledger, which requires significant overhead to control the network.
We are able to significantly reduce the overhead by designing our system to
only allow a consortium of writers, which in addition allows us to benefit
from traditional Byzantine fault tolerance algorithms.
The architecture is organized into three components; clients, ledger nodes
and storage nodes. We separate the agreement protocol from the storage
servers [43, 44] and study different quorum sizes for these two components.
A prototype is developed and evaluated against the identified criteria. In our
experiments we investigate the limitations of the prototype.
In addition, we investigate the following research questions:
RQ1 How can the ledger support high update and query rates, yet offer
sufficient integrity guarantees?
RQ2 How large peer-to-peer network sizes is reasonable to support?
RQ3 What are the challenges of a permissioned blockchain?
1.1 Contributions and Outline
In summary, in this thesis we make the following contributions
• Design of a highly scalable architecture for a storage system built on a
permissioned blockchain.
• Identification and classification of characteristics of the storage system.
• Development of a prototype for all three components of the architec-
ture.
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• Evaluation and experimental results of the prototype developed.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces relevant background material for reading the thesis.
The focus will be on the most significant elements a blockchain system
consist of.
Chapter 3 presents a survey of existing blockchain systems as well as works
which relates to this.
Chapter 4 discuss of the design space and provides an overview of the sys-
tem architecture.
Chapter 5 describes how a prototype of the system was implemented.
Chapter 6 evaluates the implementation and present a set of experimental
results with different quorum sizes.
Chapter 7 presents suggestions for further work.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we will describe some of the fundamental properties, concepts
and terminologies needed to read this thesis and understand blockchain sys-
tems.
2.1 Consensus Protocols
The consensus problem lies at the core of distributed computing [10]. Pro-
cesses use consensus to choose a single proposed value. Consensus can be
expressed using the following safety and liveness properties [22, 23];
CS1 Only a value that has been proposed may be chosen.
CS2 Only a single value is chosen.
CS3 A process never learns that a value has been chosen unless it actually
has been.
CL1 Some proposed value is eventually chosen.
CL2 Once a value is chosen, correct learners eventually learn it.
In this context, safety means to never violate the consistency of the shared
state. If it is violated at some time t, it can never be satisfied again after that
time. The liveness properties makes sure that given enough time, something
advantageous will eventually happen. More formally, for any time t, there is
a chance that the property will be satisfied at some time t′ ≥ t [10].
14
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The underlying consensus protocol of a distributed system is a mecha-
nism to make the participating nodes agree on how the shared state will be
updated. Each of the nodes may have their own copy of the shared state,
and thereby increasing the availability of the system as a whole. Given the
same initial state and by having all the nodes execute updates in the same
order, the state will remain consistent across all nodes. This is known as
state machine replication in the literature.
A consensus protocol guarantees the safety and liveness properties based
on its system model, which specifies the environment it is designed for. The
system model is typically described using assumptions about the elements in
the system, such as: network links, the presence of synchronized clocks and
the expected behavior of nodes. If the system model neglects to consider
some real world aspect, one should not have confidence in the deployment of
the protocol.
With regards to blockchain systems, the security and robustness [12] is
largely based on the choice of consensus protocol. The type of consensus that
is most relevant to discuss for blockchain systems is atomic broadcast [4],
also known as total order broadcast. The next two sections will outline how
assumptions about node behavior impact the consensus protocol.
2.1.1 Crash Tolerant
If nodes are prone to non-Byzantine faults, but otherwise follow the protocol,
consensus can be reached if less than half of the nodes are faulty. The atomic
broadcast abstraction has two events; Broadcast and Deliver. Broadcast is
the request used when a node wants to send a message to the whole network.
Deliver is the indication that outputs the message to the application layer.
The abstraction guarantees global ordering on messages delivered for all the
correct nodes, as long as only benign faults are present. The properties of
atomic broadcast can be found in [10];
1. Validity: If a correct process p broadcasts a message m, then p even-
tually delivers m.
2. No duplication: No message is delivered more than once.
3. No creation: If a process delivers a message m with sender s, then m
was previously broadcast by process s.
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4. Agreement: If a message m is delivered by some correct process, then
m is eventually delivered by every correct process.
5. Total order: Let m1 and m2 be any two messages and suppose p and
q are any two correct processes that deliver m1 and m2. If p delivers
m1 before m2, then q delivers m1 before m2.
One of the most well-known crash-tolerant consensus protocols is Paxos [22,
56], which requires 2f + 1 nodes to tolerate f benign faults. In Paxos the
network is compromised by three classes of agents; proposers, acceptors and
learners. In a typical replicated state machine configuration, all nodes will
take on the role as every agent during the protocol [16]. The clients do not
partake in the consensus protocols, but will interact with proposers when
issuing commands.
Paxos progresses in a sequence of rounds, where a single proposer is chosen
to act as the leader for each round. Each round runs in two phases. The first
phase is used to decide the leader for the round, and starts with the proposers
selecting a round number r and sending it in a 〈PREPARE〉 message to the
acceptors. If the round number r is higher than any previously seen, the
acceptor will reply with a 〈PROMISE〉 message containing the highest-
numbered proposal it has accepted.
The second phase starts once a proposer receives a response for round
number r from a majority of the acceptors. The proposer will then broad-
cast a 〈ACCEPT〉 message containing the round number r as well a value
v, where v is the value from the highest-numbered proposal amongst the
responses. If no prior proposal was received, the proposer is free to use
any value for v. The acceptor will accept the proposal for round number r
and value v unless it has already replied with a 〈PROMISE〉 for a round
greater than r. Upon accepting, the acceptor will broadcast a 〈LEARN〉
message containing the round number r and value v to all learners. Once a
learner receives a message containing the same round number and value from
a majority of the acceptors, the value is considered chosen.
2.1.2 Byzantine Fault Tolerant
Byzantine faults include both naturally occurring benign faults such as crashes
and network partitioning, as well as maliciously behaving nodes. A node may
be subverted by an invisible adversary which has the power to make it ex-
hibit arbitrary behavior. For instance it may equivocate by sending conflicting
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messages to different nodes, go out of protocol, control the scheduling of mes-
sages, issue denial-of-service attacks and otherwise degrade performance [57].
The problem was first illustrated in [11], in which a group of generals
tries to agree on a battle plan by disseminating messages to each other. The
difficulty lies in the fact that some of the generals may be traitors, and try to
confuse the others. It is shown in [11] that it is possible to achieve consensus
as long as the maximum number of byzantine faulty nodes in a network is
less than a third of the total number of nodes.
It has been shown that deterministic protocols can not reach consensus in
a fully asynchronous system [58]. This results may be circumvented in practi-
cal BFT protocols by adding randomness(e.g. cryptography), or making tim-
ing assumptions. The most well-known practical BFT protocol is PBFT [34],
which requires 3f + 1 nodes to tolerate f Byzantine faults. PBFT lever-
ages message authenticators and assumes the partially synchronous model in
which there is a unknown upper bound on message delivery time. Similarly
to Paxos, PBFT progresses in a sequence of rounds, with a unique leader in
every round [4].
Several techniques to reduce the redundancy requirements have been pro-
posed [59, 44, 43, 60]. Particularly interesting for our protocol is the separa-
tion of agreement and execution phase [44, 43], where the replica requirement
changes to 3f+1 for the agreement and to 2f+1 for executing state machine
commands.
An example of a BFT protocol that works in an asynchronous network
by adding randomness is HoneyBadgerBFT [60]. It adds randomness by a
series of cryptographic techniques such as threshold signatures, erasure cod-
ing and secret sharing [60]. Experiments in [60] show a significant thoughput
improvement over PBFT when the number of nodes is 16 or higher.
2.2 Blockchain
There is no standard technical definition of the term blockchain [5], however
we will use the definition most commonly found in the literature, where it is
defined as a data structure [1, 3]. The data structure is an ever-growing list of
records, called blocks. The blocks are ordered in an append-only chain, where
they have a cryptographic link to their predecessor, which servers to protect
the blockchains integrity. It is not possible to remove or make changes to a
block after it is added to the chain.
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Figure 2.1: Blockchain formation. The gray boxes are blocks in the main
chain. The green box is the genesis block. The two successors of the second
block form a fork. The red blocks are orphans.
The first block of the chain has no predecessor, and is therefore called
the genesis block. At any point there may be more than one block linking to
the same predecessor, this is commonly referred to as forking, and leaves the
network with an inconsistent view of the data. Due to the cryptographic link
between the blocks, a fork will never be resolved by the merging of blocks,
thus the most common strategy for handling forks is to only consider the
longest chain of blocks to be valid and part of the main chain. The blocks
outside the main chain are called orphans. Figure 2.1 illustrates a blockchain
formation.
Due to the immutable property [33], by including a timestamp in every
block, a blockchain can also provide an approximate idea of when each block
was created [1], in addition to the exact order of creation [61]. The idea
to link issued timestamps was first proposed in [75], and is known as linked
timestamping in the literature [2].
A powerful usage of blockchains is as a distributed ledger [4, 12]. A
distributed ledger can be thought of as a distributed database, in which the
data is replicated, synchronized and shared between multiple participants
over a peer-to-peer network. Each participant has their own identical local
copy of the ledger, thus it is necessary to deploy consensus algorithms to
ensure correct replication across all participants. Blockchains replicate that
data only for resilience, not for scalability [4].
A distributed ledger reduces the systemic risk in comparison to centralized
solutions [5]. However, the endpoint-security is far worse, as the node is
responsible for safely and securely storing their private keys since there is no
way to recover them if they are lost or stolen.
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A blockchain system can also be classified as atomic broadcast or total
order broadcast. Atomic broadcast ensures agreement on a common global
order of messages amongst all the nodes in a system [10]. The analog for
message in a blockchain is a transaction. Every block contains a batch of
transactions. By batching the transactions, the number of communication
steps to achieve global ordering is reduced, as opposed to agreeing on every
message individually.
Many blockchain system allow the incorporation of smart contracts into
transactions. These smart contracts are instructions which enforce the exe-
cution of arbitrary tasks. The smart contract may be written in a domain-
specific or a general-purpose programming language [4], depending on its im-
plementation. Blockchain systems have vastly different properties depending
on their implementation. A comparison of a collection of existing implemen-
tations is given in Chapter 3.
Two main schools of blockchains exist: permissionless and permissioned.
These will be discussed in detail in the following sections.
2.2.1 Permissionless Blockchain
Also known as a public blockchain, perhaps the most well-known example
of a permissionless blockchain is Bitcoin. In principle, anyone with the ap-
propriate software can become a participating node in the network. Due
to being open to the public, no trust between the participants is assumed.
Thus, the consensus protocol must be resistant to both naturally occurring
faults, as well as maliciously crafted behaviors. Such a resistant consensus
protocol is known in the literature as Byzantine fault tolerant, and is further
discussed in Section 2.1.2.
A consequence of allowing anyone to create an unlimited amount of iden-
tities in the network, is the possibility of Sybil attacks [62]. A Sybil attack
in this context means that an adversary forges enough identities to control
consensus in the network. This is possible due to the fact that most fault-
tolerant systems are reliant on some kind of majority of nodes are honest
and reliable in order to make progress and achieve consensus [5]. In order
to deflect Sybil attacks, permissionless blockchains use different functions to
control leader elections, so that controlling a majority of nodes in the net-
work will not be sufficient to control consensus. Examples of such functions
are proof-of-work, proof-of-elapsed-time and proof-of-stake.
Proof-of-work was originally created as means to deter spam [5]. By re-
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quiring the sender to include a solution to a puzzle which demand a moderate
amount of computational work, it would slow down or deter a spammer.
In Bitcoin, proof-of-work is incorporated as a security mechanism limiting
the creation of blocks. In particular, the requirement to append a block to
the chain is that the hash value of the block must be under a given thresh-
old. This is more commonly known as mining. Finding a hash value under
a given threshold is often referred to as difficulty in the literature. Nodes
are encouraged to find new blocks because whoever creates them will receive
substantial monetary rewards in form of bitcoins. This results in an inter-
esting power triangle consisting of the ledger rewarding miners, the miners
that secure integrity of the ledger, and the perceived value of the currency
rewarded. Interestingly, the transaction rate heavily impacts the security
from double-spend attacks [53, 54]. The two parameters which limits the
rate are block size and block interval. In Bitcoin, currently the average rate
between blocks is 10 minutes, the block size 1MB [53, 3].
As everyone always could use another dollar, the monetization of such
protocols leads to relentless competition. As noted in Section 3.5, Bitcoins
total energy consumption is steadily increasing, and already surpasses entire
nations. Thus, alternative approaches which are not dependent on immense
computational power have been suggested. One such approach is proof-of-
elapsed-time, which use secure enclaves in the CPU to control leader election.
The secure enclave executes a waiting step in such a way that the other
nodes can verify that the wait was executed properly. An implementation of
proof-of-elapsed-time can be found in Hyperledger Sawtooth [50, 51], which
builds on Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) to generate the random
delay. An obvious drawback of proof-of-elapsed-time is its reliance on custom
hardware, especially if it’s a single vendor that can produce it.
Ethereum is planning to move from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake using
the Casper algorithm [52]. In PoS, each nodes chance to be able to propose
the next block is proportionate to their stake in the system. If there are
no incentives for a node to act honest, a node may vote on multiple blocks
supporting multiple forks in an attempt to maximize their earnings [12].
This is also known as the nothing-at-stake attack, which Ethereum aims to
counteract by penalizing malfeasant nodes [52].
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2.2.2 Permissioned Blockchain
A permissioned blockchain, also known as a private or consortium blockchain
in the literature, allows membership to be controlled by a system operator.
Typically the admission into the network is controlled by a digital certifi-
cate. In most cases this will be issued by a certificate authority(CA), which
is a trusted central authority. Analogous to other database systems, at a
high level, a participant may take on one of two roles. The first being
as a writer, also known as validator, which participates in the consensus
protocol, and grows the blockchain. The other is a reader, also known as
non-validator, which may only read and audit the blockchain. However, the
blockchain system may have many more granular roles, such as writers lim-
ited to only certain type of transactions, or readers with only a partial view
of the blockchain.
Under the assumption that the membership view is not compromised by
an adversary, there is no risk of a Sybil attack [62]. With the absence of
Sybil attacks, consensus protocols which are Byzantine fault tolerant can be
used. BFT is discussed further in Section 2.1.2. These have been researched
for decades [11], and for blockchain systems offer vastly different properties
than their proof-of-work inspired counterpart [8, 12, 50]. In particular, BFT
style consensus can offer vastly superior throughput and latency compared
to proof-of-work. The reasoning being that these properties are coupled with
security in proof-of-work. This is further elaborated on in Section 2.2.1.
Another advantage with BFT style consensus is the immediate transaction
finality, which means that once a block is added to the ledger, it will never
be removed or otherwise considered invalid. Proof-of-work only offers proba-
bilistic transaction finality, which means that there is a chance that multiple
blocks will be added at the same height and cause forking. This means that
a client will have to wait a long time until transactions are finalized and
confirmed, and in Bitcoins case, up to 1 hour [1, 2]. There is also a difference
in the form of adversary tolerance, where BFT consensus can tolerate less
than 1
3
of the validators being Byzantine, and proof-of-work less than 1
4
of
the computing power being controlled by adversaries [53].
Even though it is possible to design a permissioned blockchain without
BFT consensus, to address research question RQ3, a major drawback of
BFT consensus is that scalability of the number of validators is limited. At
a certain point the amount of overhead in the messages exchanged between
nodes becomes crippling. Some recommend that the number of validators be
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kept no higher than 20 [53, 12]. Chapter 3 contains a comparison of various
implementations of permissioned blockchains.
2.3 Cryptographic Hash Functions
The job of a basic hash function is to map an arbitrary long message into
a fixed length value. In order for the hash function to be classified as a
cryptographic hash function, and be useful in blockchain systems, several
key properties are required [9];
1. Preimage resistant (Hiding): Given any output value y = H(x), it
is computationally infeasible to find x.
2. Second preimage (Puzzle-friendliness): Given any input value x,
finding a different input value y such that H(x) = H(y) is computation-
ally infeasible. Meaning that it is very difficult to target the output of
the hash function to a particular value.
3. Collision resistant: Finding a pair of two unique input values that
map to the same output value is computationally infeasible.
4. Efficiency: It is computationally cheap to calculate a hash value.
5. Pseudorandomness: The output hash values will be distributed in
such a way that it will pass standard pseudorandomness tests.
The term preimage means that for a hash value h = H(x), x is the preimage
of h. The definition for the hiding and puzzle-friendliness properties given
here differs slightly from [1], as we have omitted the secret random value
concatenated with the input value.
Vulnerabilities on the hashing algorithms are constantly researched. In
addition to this, the power of supercomputers is ever-increasing. Both these
factors force the constant development of new and stronger cryptographic
hash functions. A notable example of a hashing algorithm which previously
was considered cryptographically secure, and is now broken, is MD5. MD5
was first published in 1992 [19], and by 2012 it had been used as an attack
vector several times, most infamously by the Flame malware [20] in which a
collision attack was performed to forge a certificate to sign code on Windows
systems.
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One of the most widely used cryptographic hash functions are those in
the SHA-2 family. Applications include SSH, TLS, SSL, several blockchain
systems and many others. In particular the SHA-256 algorithm is used in
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies for calculating proof-of-work and verifying
transactions. In 2015 the latest member of the SHA family, SHA-3 was
released [21].
2.4 Digital Signatures
A digital signature is a scheme built on public-key cryptographic used to
provide data authentication between two parties which is verifiable by third
parties. In most blockchain systems, digital signatures are an essential com-
ponent as they allow all the readers to verify the originator of every transac-
tion and block.
Before an entity is able to digitally sign, two distinct keys must be gen-
erated; a public key and a private key [10]. This is known as public-key
cryptography or asymmetric cryptography in the literature. The keys need
to be generated in a secure way, and it is especially important to have a good
source of randomness.
The public key is used to verify your signature, and is assumed to be
known by everyone in the network. In fact, some systems will use the public
key as your pseudonym or address. On the other hand, the private key will
be used to sign, and thus it is of utmost importance to keep it secure, as a
compromised private key can be used by an attacker to sign on your behalf.
The desired security properties of a digital signature are described in [9];
Authentication High confidence in the identity of the communicating en-
tity.
Data integrity Assurance that the received data has not been tampered
with by an adversary.
Non-repudiation It is not possible to deny having sent data which the user
has signed.
These properties are obtained through the following design requirements of
a digital signature scheme [9];
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• The signature must depend on both the data being signed, and the
user signing it. This property is crucial for providing non-repudiation
and preventing forgery.
• It is computationally cheap to both produce the digital signature and
for another party to recognize and verify it.
• It is computationally infeasible to forge a signature without knowing
the private key.
Public keys may be distributed in a number of different ways, as the
security properties assume that the public key is known by everyone. The
main challenge in distributing the key lies in proving the link between your
real-life identity and the key.
2.5 Message-Authentication Codes (MACs)
As an alternative to digital signatures, a message-authentication code (MAC)
can be used to authenticate data exchange between two entities [10]. The
MAC function may be built using symmetric encryption, such as crypto-
graphic hash functions or block ciphers [9].
Due to them not being reliant on the computationally expensive asym-
metric ciphers, MACs are computationally cheaper to compute and verify
compared to digital signatures [10]. The drawback is that MACs do not
provide the non-repudiation property, meaning that there is no way to prove
who sent a message.
2.6 Merkle Trees
A Merkle tree [55] is a tree-based datastructure used for efficient integrity
verification. Its leaf nodes are computed by hashing the input data blocks,
and all other nodes are computed by hashing its child nodes. Most commonly
in blockchain systems each internal node will have no more than two children,
making it a binary tree. An example of a Merkle tree is shown in Figure 2.2.
A typical usage in blockchain systems is having a every transaction contained
within a block serve as input to the tree, and for the root hash to be included
in the block header [30, 1].
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root=h(n0||n1)
n0=h(n00||n01) n1=h(n10||n11)
n00=h(tx1) n01=h(tx2) n10=h(tx3) n11=h(tx4)
tx1 tx2 tx3 tx4
Figure 2.2: Binary Merkle tree. The value of leaf nodes is the hash of a data
block, and the value of every non-leaf node is the hash of its children.
The integrity verification is efficient due to it only being necessary to look
at the value of the root node to detect modifications. The reason being that
any change to a node or the tree structure will propagate all the way up to
the root, and thus change its value.
Another important property of a sorted binary Merkle tree is that of
efficiently proving whether or not a particular leaf node is part of the tree.
Since we only need to compute the hashes along the path from the root
to the leaf, the number of hashes required to compute are logarithmically
proportional to the number of nodes in the tree [1].
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2.7 Peer-to-Peer Networks
A cornerstone to achieving true decentralization, is having peers operate on
equal terms. The peer-to-peer (P2P) network describes an architecture where
there is no centralized control or hierarchical organization, and every node
runs software with equivalent functionality [24]. All the nodes participating
are considered equals and share the responsibility of keeping the network
operational [3]. The P2P networks are usually implemented on top of the
existing network topology, where it operates as an overlay network [29] to
facilitate the logical direct communication between nodes [25].
P2P networks are used in a wide range of applications [29, 25, 2], such
as file-sharing, data distribution, Internet telephony, scientific computing,
secure Internet communication and blockchains. Examples of P2P systems
used for file-sharing include Bittorrent and IPFS. IPFS will be discussed
further in Section 3.1. These systems can scale to very large networks, and
use a Distributed hash table [25, 28] to map file-identifies to the peers sharing
the files, enabling lookup in O(log n) time.
In order for a node to disseminate information to all other nodes, it may
use a broadcast abstraction. To ensure reliable message delivery in the pres-
ence of faulty processes or links, the node sending the message also needs to
receive some form of acknowledgment [10]. This approach does not scale well,
as it requires O(n2) messages, and may therefore become a severe bottleneck
in a system with many participants. Instead, a probabilistic broadcast ap-
proach such as the gossip protocol provides a scalable option. The following
description of the basic operations of a gossip protocol is adopted from [10].
The node wanting to broadcast a message will select k nodes at random,
and send them the message. Then every node that received the message
selects another k nodes at random and forward the message to them, and so
on. This will continue for R rounds, and thus the probability of every node
in the network receiving the message is dependent on the fanout parameter
k and number of rounds R. Due to the probabilistic nature of the protocol,
reliable broadcast is not guaranteed, and thus it may terminate before every
node in the network has received the message.
However, using gossip protocol in a State machine replication setting with
Byzantine fault tolerance systems adds another level of complexity, as replicas
might be reluctant to update their state without receiving confirmation from
a quorum of correct nodes. In particular, vulnerabilities of a gossip-based
protocol include Denial-of-service attacks targeted at a small subset of the
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correct nodes [27], and network partitioning in which the nodes in either
partition might enter different states. Examples of BFT systems using gossip-
based broadcast include Fireflies [25], which is a overlay network protocol
that provides a secure and scalable membership service. Fireflies organizes
the nodes in a pseudorandom structure, in such a way that every node is
monitored by at least one correct node.
Most blockchain systems use gossiping to disseminate new blocks to all
nodes in the network. This is true for both schools of blockchains. In the case
of permissionless blockchains using proof-of-work consensus, such as Bitcoin
and Ethereum [1], it is well understood that the propagation of new blocks
might be delayed, therefore miners may create an relay network between
themselves to minimize the latency of transmission of new blocks [3], as after
all, time is money.
2.8 Proof of Storage
The most simple way of proving to someone that you possess some piece of
data is to send them the data in its entirety. However, this is problematic
both in terms of network bandwidth, which is a limited resource, and hard-
drive I/O since the performance of magnetic disks has not improved as rapidly
as its capacity [45]. For this reason, it must be possible able to provide non-
reputable proofs without accessing the entire file.
The basis of the proof is to have the verifier V store a constant amount of
metadata which is kept secret from the prover P and used to generate prob-
abilistic storage challenges C. Examples of such algorithms are [14, 17, 18].
In particular [17, 18] computes an homomorphic authenticator for every file
block, and stores this alongside the file at P. The homomorphic authentica-
tors acts as verification metadata, and using them P is able to combine blocks
and authenticators into a single aggregate block and authenticator [18]. A
challenge-proof cycle may be summarized as follows:
1. Verifier V generates a random challenge C and sends it to P.
2. P computes the proof based on C and sends it to V.
3. V verifies the proof. If the proof does not match, P node will be marked
as faulty. Failure to respond will also result in being marked as faulty.
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The probabilistic proofs are created in such a way that false negatives may
not occur, only false positives. Meaning that, even though a proof matches,
P may still be faulty, but the challenge was not strong enough to detect it.
2.8.1 Public Verifiability
Not to be confused with the property which allows verification of data in-
tegrity in a blockchain, in the context of proof-of-storage the public verifia-
bility property refers to the ability of anyone, not just the data owner to take
on the role as the verifier. The algorithms in [14, 17, 18] can all be modified
to offer this property.
Chapter 3
Related Work
This chapter starts off with Table 3, showing an overview of the characteris-
tics of different consensus algorithms in blockchain systems. The table uses
data found in [50, 12, 8, 15]. After the table, the two systems our prototype
builds upon, IPFS and Tendermint will be introduced. Then we will take a
look at two of the blockchains in the Hyperledger framework, then Corda,
a system which is inspired by blockchains and then Bitcoin. Finally three
systems which resembles ours, Filecoin, Sia and Storj will be described.
BFT PoW PoS PoET
Blockchain
type
Permissioned Permissionless Both Both
Throughput High Low Limited Limited
Finality
(Latency)
Immediate Probabilistic Probabilistic Probabilistic
Number of
readers
High High High High
Number of
writers
Low High High High
Maximum
adversaries






No Yes Yes No
Table 3.1: Comparison of consensus algorithms used in blockchain systems.
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3.1 IPFS
IPFS is a content-addressable, distributed P2P file system [28]. IPFS incor-
porates ideas from BitTorrent, Git, DHT and SFS. All the stored data is
content-addressable (CAS) by its unique, immutable content identifier, also
abbreviated as CID. In addition the fact that the CID is generated using a
Merkle DAG, means that any changes to the data can be easily detected.
By default IPFS comes with a set of bootstrap nodes that it will attempt
to form a network with. However, in order to form a private network, IPFS-
Cluster may be used in a layer on top of IPFS. IPFS-Cluster facilitates the
dissemination of stored data in order to avoid a single point of failure. The
leader-based consensus algorithm Raft [38] is used to coordinate the state
amongst the IPFS nodes. Raft is crash-recover for benign faults, which means
nodes are assumed to fail by stopping or crashing. Malicious behavior, such as
sending conflicting to the network is not supported. However, as elaborated
on in Chapter 4, our design relies on proof-of-storage to detect malicious
behavior of the storage nodes. Once a cluster is up, peers are expected to
run continuously [32].
The distributed log of Raft which every node follows is appended using
mainly two operations; Pin and Unpin [32]. The Pin-operation tells a node
to store a piece of data locally, and will thus disseminate the data throughout
the network. The Unpin-operation is the opposite, as it tells the nodes that
it is no longer necessary to keep some piece of data. Note that Unpin is
not an explicit call to delete the data, as it is up to the individual IPFS
node to decide when it should be permanently deleted. The cluster can
not enforce forgetfulness guarantees regarding the deletion of data, meaning
that a malicious individual node that refuses to delete some data will be
undetectable.
3.2 Tendermint
Tendermint is a set of software used for BFT state machine replication in dis-
tributed applications [31]. It consists of two main components; a blockchain
consensus engine called Tendermint Core, and a generic application inter-
face. Our implementation is mainly concerned with the generic application
inferface, also referred to as ABCI, but a description of Tendermint Core will
be given here for completeness.
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Tendermint Core uses a permissioned blockchain, where only actors with
a registered public-/private-key pair may be able to participate in the con-
sensus protocol. The consensus protocol was originally based on DLS [36],
but has since been resigined to resemble PBFT [34, 33]. Participants in the
consensus protocol are split into validators and non-validators. The differ-
ence being that a non-validator does not sign any votes, but they still keep
up with consensus and process transactions. The protocol consists of three-
step rounds, where a designated validator will be deterministically voted to
act as the proposer for a single round. The proposer will broadcast a set
of transactions to be included into the next block in the chain. Safety and
liveness are guaranteed as long as less than 1
3
of the validators are faulty.
Algorithm 1 gives a simplified view of the Tendermint Core. The protocol
uses the partly synchronous model. In particular, the validators will only wait
a small amount of time for a new proposed block before voting a new validator
to act as the proposer in a new round. The proof-of-stake algorithm of
Tendermint allows easy manipulation of voting power amongst the validators.
A quorum in the consensus protocol is actually based on this voting power,
and not the number of nodes participating.
The protocol starts once a validator receives a transaction from a client.
The transaction is validated by calling the applications CheckTx method.
The details of the implementation of CheckTx are discussed in Section 5.4.
If CheckTx returns a OK status code, the transaction will be added to a
memory cache and relayed to the other validators, any other status code
results in the immediate discarding of the transaction. The memory cache
of transactions is more commonly known in the literature as mempool.
After the proposer broadcasts a new block for inclusion in the chain, two
phases of voting will take place amongst the validators. The first phase is
called pre-vote and the latter pre-commit. Both phases require that more
than 2
3
votes for the same block in the same round to make progress [31].
The transactions in the block will be ordered. After a successful pre-commit
phase, a commit is executed, and the new block is appended to the tail of
the blockchain.
Once a new block is committed, Tendermint Core will attempt to execute
the associated applications DeliverTx method once for every transaction in
the block. This can be used to do any state transitions associated with a
single transaction. Though not necessary for our prototype, it is important
to note that since the transactions are ordered, every node will execute De-
liverTx in the same order. Additionally, DeliverTx may return the result of
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its execution, making it possible to report faults in the actual transaction.
It is left up to the application developer to make sure that the execution is
deterministic, so that we end up with a consistent state amongst the repli-
cas. Section 5.4 discusses determinism further. DeliverTx is sandwiched by
two other calls to the application stack, BeginBlock and EndBlock. Though
not used in the prototype, these may be used to persistently store the ap-
plication state or to change the validator configuration for the next block.
After EndBlock, a final call to Commit is done to compute a cryptographic
commitment for inclusion into the next blocks header.
All of the transactions contained in the block are then removed from
the mempool, and the remaining transactions are then re-evaluated against
CheckTx. The reasoning being that these transactions may no longer be
valid as the new block could have changed the applications state.





upon event 〈cor, Init〉 do
proposalWait := 0 ; // Monotonically increasing every second
uniqueid := 0 ;
height := 0 ;
round := 0 ;




upon exists tx ∈ mempool do
if proposer(self, round) then
block := ∅;
forall tx ∈ mempool such that |block| < α do
block := block ∪ {tx.tx, tx.uniqueid};
trigger 〈Broadcast | [ProposalMsg, block, h, r]〉;
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upon exists proposalWait = ProposalTimeout do
// Weak synchrony assumption
trigger 〈Broadcast | [VoteMsg, nil, h, r]〉;
upon event 〈cor, NewTx | q, [ProposalMsg, block, h, r]〉 do
if h+1 > height then
trigger 〈ego, Gossip | [LaggingBlock, h]〉;
return
else if h ≤ height ∨ round 6= r then
return
forall tx ∈ block do
if app.CheckTx(tx) = False then;
trigger 〈Broadcast | [VoteMsg, nil, h, r]〉;
return
votedBlock = block ;
trigger 〈Broadcast | [VoteMsg, block, h, r]〉;
upon event 〈cor, NewTx | tx〉 do
if app.CheckTx(tx) = True then;
mempool := mempool ∪ {tx, uniqueid};
uniqueid := uniqueid + 1;
upon event 〈cor, Prevote | q, [VoteMsg, block, h, r]〉 do
prevotes := prevotes ∪ {block, h, r};
upon exists |prevotes| > 2n
3
such that ∀ {block, h, r}:
block = votedBlock, h = height, r = round do
prevotes := ∅;
trigger 〈Broadcast | [Commit, block, h, r]〉;
upon event 〈cor, Precommit | q, [Commit, block, h, r]〉 do
precommits := precommits ∪ {block, h, r};
upon exists |precommits| > 2n
3
such that ∀ {block, h, r}:
block = votedBlock, h = height, r = round do
precommits := ∅;
if block = nil then;
round := round + 1;
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else




height := height + 1;
round := 0 ;
mempool := mempool \ votedBlock ;
votedBlock := nil ;
upon event 〈cor, Query | [path, DATA]〉 do
trigger 〈cor, QueryResponse | node, [app.Query(path, DATA)]〉;
3.3 Hyperledger Frameworks
Hyperledger is a collection of multiple blockchain frameworks hosted by the
Linux Foundation. The frameworks seems to be specialized towards business
applications [50]. We will take a look at two of the frameworks; Fabric and
Sawtooth.
3.3.1 Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric is a platform for distributed ledger solutions [37]. It is
written in Golang with a modular architecture so that components such as
consensus and membership services are plug-and-play. Its goals are to provide
high degrees of confidentiality, resiliency, flexibility and scalability [37].
The type of blockchain is permissioned, meaning that only known entities
can participate in the network. Consensus is broken into three phases [50];
Endorsement, Ordering and Validation. Hyperledger Fabric supports plug-
gable consensus for all the phases, giving the application developer great
flexibility.
For the ordering service, Hyperledger Fabric provides Apache Kafka as the
consensus mechanism [4, 50]. In fact, Hyperledger Fabric assumes expertise
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with Kafka [37] to use it in an ordering service. Apache Kafka [65] is a
distributed streaming platform aimed at handling large amounts of real-time
data. It uses a publish-subscribe interface to send messages, allowing multiple
readers for each message. Kafka uses Apache ZooKeeper to coordinate its
brokers internally [37], and tolerates up to f < n
2
crash faults [65]. Fabric
inherits this resilience [4].
3.3.2 Hyperledger Sawtooth
Sawtooth is a permissionless blockchain for general-purpose smart contracts [4].
It uses a lottery-based consensus algorithm called proof-of-elapsed-time [50].
As with proof-of-work, there has to be a waiting period between leader elec-
tions. Originally contributed by Intel [4], proof-of-elapsed-time aims to ex-
ecute this waiting period without expending huge amounts of energy. The
protocol is reliant on a secure enclave on the CPU in order to provide proofs
for executing the waiting period.
The secure enclave executes a waiting step in such a way that the other
nodes can verify that the wait was executed properly. The secure enclave can
be found on Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX). It relies on custom
hardware, and the probability of winning the election is proportional to the
number of nodes in the network.
3.4 Corda
Corda is an open-source distributed ledger platform developed by R3 [7],
designed for semi-private networks in which admission requires obtaining an
identity signed by a root authority [6]. It has a special emphasis on the finan-
cial world and business applications. Though it shares many of the benefits of
a blockchain, it differs from the definition given in Section 2.2. In particular,
the transaction execution model produces a hashed directed acyclic graph [4].
There is no broadcast of transactions in the network. All communcation is
directed, and thus data is shared on a need-to-know basis [6]. This gives
nodes in the network partial visibility of the entire transaction graph. Dif-
ferent organizations may merge their ledgers by establishing a two-way trust
between notaries and certificate authorities.
The Corda network does not organize time into blocks [6], instead it uses
notary services to provide transaction ordering and timestamping. Each
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network may consist of multiple notaries, and they may each run different
consensus algorithms. The fault tolerance of the network depends on the
choice of the consensus algorithm. Corda offers support for running Raft or
BFT-SMaRt [4] on notary nodes. Raft gives tolerance to crash-faults, and
can tolerate up to f < n
2




The global phenomena, Bitcoin [61], is a decentralized cryptocurrency, and
first of its kind [5]. Bitcoin runs on a permissionless blockchain, allowing
anyone to join the network. The consensus mechanism is proof-of-work. To
handle forking, the network will consider the longest chain to be the valid
chain. This is analogous to the one with the most accumulated computational
effort [73].
Every block in the chain contains a bundle of transactions. Every trans-
action specifies a number of inputs, a number of outputs, and some meta-
data [1]. In effect it moves coins from one entity to another. Due to fact
that anyone can join the network, each entity is only associated with a public
key, and not a real life identity. All the inputs of the transaction have to be
digitally signed for the transaction to be considered valid. The recipients of
the coins do not have to be online or take any action for the transaction to be
valid. In addition, it is possible to use the outputs to specify more advanced
scripts. Bitcoin script are written in its own stack-based language [3], which
offers only a limited set of instructions. The scripts have to be deterministic,
and can have only one of two outcomes after executing, success or error.
On average, a new block will be mined every 10 minutes [3]. In the case
of Bitcoin, mining a new block means to find a nonce so that the hash value
of the proposed block will be under a given threshold. The protocol self-
adjusts this threshold in such a way that it’s proportional to the amount of
computational power available in the network.
Several studies [60, 53, 26] have suggested to either increase the block
size or reduce the block latency as means to improve performance. However,
adjusting these parameters have consequences for the consensus mechanism.
In particular, with a larger block size it will take longer for it to propagate
in the network, and a lower block latency leads to increased forking and
instability when agreeing on the valid chain [53]. Currently the throughput
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of Bitcoin is limited to 7 tx/sec [3, 1], several orders of magnitude lower than
Visa, which processes 2,000 tx/sec on average [2], with peaks of up to 59,000
tx/sec [60].
A major drawback of Bitcoin and proof-of-work in general is that the
consensus mechanism consumes enormous amounts of energy [12, 30]. Bitcoin
is vulnerable to selfish miners controlling more than 1/4 of the computational
power in the network [53]. A selfish miner will withhold blocks it has mined
from the network for as long as possible in order to get an unfair advantage
mining the next block in the chain.
3.6 Filecoin
Filecoin [13] is a decentralized storage network that serves as an incentive
layer on top of IPFS [28]. The protocol uses its own token, filecoin as the
currency to pay for services. The network is comprised of clients who pay for
storing and retrieving data, storage miners that earn tokens by storing data,
and retrieval miners that earn tokens by serving data.
To organize the interactions between the client and the miners, a permis-
sionless blockchain is used, also referred to as a ledger. The ledger is made
up of transactions specifying storage- and retrieval orders from the clients,
storage pledges from miners and proofs of storage. In addition, each block
has an allocation table which keeps the state of network by specifying on
which storage miner every piece of data is stored.
Filecoin introduces two novel proof-of-storage algorithms. The first is
proof-of-replication which is used to prove that the data has been replicated
to its own uniquely dedicated storage. The second is proof-of-spacetime
which aims to verify that the data was stored for a specific time interval.
As opposed to the wasteful proof-of-work algorithm of Bitcoin, Filecoin
aims to let the work done by miners be useful. In particular, the probability
to be elected as the next block creator is proportional to amount of data
stored for the network [13].
3.7 Sia
Sia [66] is a decentralized open-source cloud storage platform built on a
permissionless blockchain. The system allows peers on the network to rent
CHAPTER 3. RELATED WORK 38
storage from each other. The currency used to pay for services in Sia is called
siacoin. Siacoin may also be obtained through mining or trading [66]. Only
the storage contracts defining the terms of the agreement are stored on the
blockchain. The payload data is stored on the storage providers, also known
as hosts.
Similar to Filecoin, a host agrees to store a client’s data and to peri-
odically submit proof that the data is stored while the storage contract is
valid. Clients may protect themselves from hosts going offline and thus their
data becoming unavailable by striping the file into chunks, and then applying
erasure codes to split each chunk into multiple pieces, but only requiring a
subset of pieces to reconstruct the file. Currently, each chunk of the file is
split into 30 pieces, while requiring 10 pieces to reconstruct [67]. Sia encrypts
each piece using the Twofish algorithm [67].
All the pieces will be disseminated to a total of 50 hosts, of which no host
may hold multiple pieces for a single chuck and the target redundancy for
a piece is 3 times [67]. Each host must have 97% uptime in order to fulfill
the storage contract. Additionally, the host must regularly submit storage
proofs to the network. While Filecoin and Storj have a maximum token
supply, siacoin is monotonically increasing [66].
3.8 Storj
Storj [71] is an open-source peer-to-peer cloud storage network built on the
distributed hash table (DHT), Kademlia [70]. Storj uses a permissionless
blockchain to manage the metadata of the stored data [72]. Similar to File-
coin [13] and Sia [66], the blockchain is used to detect unauthorized modifi-
cation and deletion of data. In Storj, only the data owner can issue storage
challenges. However, the proofs are recorded on the ledger and thus anyone
can verify them.
The currency used to pay for services is called storjcoin. To improve
performance and availability, every uploaded file goes through a sharding
process. This means that every file is split up into multiple smaller pieces,
which are then scattered to different storage hosts on the network. In ad-
dition, this allows faster retrieval as one can download the shards in paral-
lel [71]. Clients are expected to encrypt the data before uploading, and are
themselves responsible for keeping the encryption key secure.
Chapter 4
Charting the Design Space for
Ledger-based Storage
In this chapter, we outline the principles and design ideas for the thesis,
whose overall aim is to design a highly scalable architecture for a storage
system built on blockchain technology that requires strong data integrity.
The stored data should be permanently available, and its authenticity must
be verifiable. The system should be able to support concurrent reading and
writing by clients.
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, we have identified Filecoin [13],
Sia [66] and Storj [71] as similar systems. However, they all use a per-
missionless blockchain, allowing nodes to act as miners by storing data and
providing bandwidth. The miners are incentivized by rewarding them with
the systems own currency, respectively filecoin, siacoin and storjcoin. The
fact that anyone can join their network and store sensitive data forces the
systems to implement several mechanisms to ensure the permanent availabil-
ity of the data. In particular, churn rate might be high, resulting in the
need of a high redundancy factor to ensure the availability of the data and
keep the system running. The protocol also need to be resistant against a
malicious entity creating several identities in the system in an attempt to
gain monopoly over some piece of data. Even if the data was encrypted,
if the malicious entity held the only copy of some data it could attempt to
extort the owner of the data. In addition, the clients will periodically ask
the storage nodes to provide proof-of-storage, which will consume a lot of
bandwidth as the redundancy factor and the number of hosts increases.
We design our storage system with a permissioned blockchain, and adopt
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a hybrid decentralized model where the ledger- and storage nodes are op-
erated by trusted system operators. The use of permissioned blockchains
allows us to use traditional BFT consensus, which enables the system to
provide low latency for client requests and high throughput for transaction
processing.
Throughout this chapter we will attempt to link our findings to the re-
search questions posted in Chapter 1.
4.1 System Model and Assumptions
The system assumes the partially synchronous model [10, 30], there is no
agreement on global time, and the computation speed of every operation
and network delay is assumed to be bounded with an unknown upper bound
∆ relative to real time. The nodes are connected in a network where the
links are unreliable, and that may fail to deliver the messages, reorder them
or duplicate them. The nodes have access to an internal clock which has
a bounded difference to the global clock, and there is a finite latency on
message exchange between correct nodes.
The system uses a Byzantine failure model, in which faulty nodes may
behave arbitrarily, and even maliciously. Faulty nodes do not possess the
computing power needed to circumvent the cryptographic primitives, and
there are no known methods to trivialize their security mechanisms. Correct
nodes never divulge their private keys to any other node, and a node cannot
steal a private key by any means.
The system can guarantee liveness and safety under the following con-
ditions; nc ≥ fc, nl > 3fl, ns > 2fs. Where nc, nl, ns means the total
number of clients, ledger nodes and storage nodes, respectively, and fc, fl,
fs means the number of Byzantine faulty clients, ledger nodes and storage
nodes, respectively.
We assume that the ledger- and storage nodes possess a full membership
view of the system. The clients have a partial membership view, as they need
only know of the ledger- and storage nodes. Thus, a client may multicast its
messages to f + 1 different nodes in order to reach at least one correct node,
assuming no network partitioning.
Nodes can verify the origin of any message they receive. In particular, all
messages between components are digitally signed. The public and private
key-pairs used for digital signatures are certified by a trusted CA. The rea-
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son for using digital signatures as opposed to MAC is the non-repudiation
property, and that digitally signed messages can be put on the ledger and be
verified by everyone without exposing the signing key.
4.1.1 Attack Model
We assume the nodes are protected behind firewalls in order to thwart at-
tacks such as intrusion and Denial-of-service. Insider attacks [76], such as
an operator that compromises a quorum of the ledger nodes are not consid-
ered in this thesis, as this would be solved outside the protocol. We do not
consider any countermeasures to prevent uploading illegal content.
As noted in [25], errors in the mechanisms that maintain the membership
view can be detrimental to the protocol. In particular, an attacker may
add or remove members in such a way that the stated fault tolerance is
circumvented. As the membership view resides locally on each member, we
assume that such an attack is not possible.
Incoming transactions will be kept in cache, also known as the mempool
until their validity can be determined. Thus, it is vulnerable to denial of
service attacks [33].







The architecture designed is shown in Figure 4.1, and is organized into three
core components; clients, ledger nodes and storage nodes. The storage nodes
are responsible for keeping the stored data in persistent storage. The ledger
nodes are responsible for maintaining the blockchain, which contains pointers
to the stored data.
The storage nodes are connected in a peer-to-peer network, and each has
a full replica of the system’s stored data. A client is able to upload arbitrary
data to a storage node, as well as download it. The storage node uses content-
addressing [28] so that each piece of data is identified by its unique content
identifier, CID. Once a new block is committed to the blockchain, each stor-
age node receives the update. In addition, the storage nodes possesses the
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ability to disseminate data amongst themselves.
By using a blockchain to keep track of the stored data, we gain properties
such as public verifiability of data authenticity and linked timestamping [1].
In addition, by having the storage nodes publish non-reputable proof-of-
storage to the blockchain, the data availability of the system can be publicly
verified.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, our study reveals that permissioned blockchains
allows the usage of traditional BFT algorithms, and thus can offer superior
throughput and latency whilst providing strong data integrity, and therefore
we opt to use it in our design. This also answers research question RQ1. The
system requires 3fl + 1 ledger nodes to tolerate fl Byzantine-faults amongst
them. As noted in [43, 44], the separation of agreement and storage allows
the reduction of the number of storage nodes to 2fs + 1 whilst tolerating up
to fs Byzantine-faults.
The public verifiability of data authenticity is provided by having each
transaction be digitally signed, and the fingerprint of the public key, or
pseudonym of the signer be included in the transaction. Thus, the privacy
of clients is reliant on the linking of the pseudonym to their real life iden-
tity. As a permissioned blockchain requires membership to be controlled by
a system operator, he may be able to perform this linking, depending on the
registration policy. Therefore clients can not expect to remain anonymous.
This is one of the challenges of permissioned blockchains, as asked in research
question RQ3.
We design our system to be highly available, but with regards to the
CAP theorem [46], availability is sacrificed for consistency in the event of
network partitions. As a new block requires a supermajority of more than
two thirds of the ledger nodes to validate, it is not possible to create two
large enough partitions without having at least one correct node participate
in both. Therefore forks may not exist, and there is no need for mechanisms
to solve conflicts. With regards to storage nodes, they will allow a client
to upload new data during partitions, but will not disseminate this data to
the other nodes until the upload transaction is committed to the blockchain.
Downloading data requires that only one correct node is reachable. In ad-
dition, high availability is achieved by having a large number of redundant
ledger- and storage nodes which allows the masking of benign and Byzantine
faults.
In terms of scalability, we design the architecture to be scalable both in
storage capacity and throughput — without sacrificing latency or integrity.
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The separation of those that handle agreements in the ledger nodes, and
those that actually store the payload data in the storage nodes allows for
great flexibility. In particular, it might be reasonable to have more ledger
nodes, while not needing as many replicas to store the payload data. As the
usage of the system increases, this separation allows the ledger nodes to scale
vertically by adding more CPU and memory, and the storage nodes to scale
horizontally by adding more nodes to increase storage capacity.
Strong data integrity gives clients confidence in the system, as they can
be certain that all data modifications are detectable. Integrity is guaranteed
through a two-pronged approach. First the integrity of the blockchain is
preserved by having each block link back to its predecessor. Second, the in-
tegrity of the stored data is preserved by using immutable content addressing
and a pointer contained within the block.
Even though the integrity guarantees of the stored data is preserved, any
modification is not detected until the data is accessed. This is problematic
because some data may very rarely be accessed. For this reason, the system
provides public verifiability of data availability by giving clients the power to
make storage nodes provide non-reputable proof-of-storage to be committed
on the blockchain.
4.3 Specification of Storage Operations
The system is operated using five operations; Change Access, Upload, Down-
load, Delete, and Verify Storage. All operation- and intermediate messages
are digitally signed by the originator. The following sections starts off with
an informal description of each operation, followed up with a slightly more
formal description of the necessary pre- and post-conditions. More details
about the implementation can be found in Section 5.1.
4.3.1 Change Access
The system defines two roles: owner and reader. The owner is always the
one that originally uploaded the data. The owner can modify the list of
readers. Note that the system can not enforce forgetfulness on users who has
downloaded data previously, but has had their access revoked. The necessary
pre- and post-conditions are defined as follows:
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Pre Condition there is a transaction committed to the blockchain claiming
the availability of some data element d identified by H(d) for which the
client is identified as an owner, and all storage nodes store a data
element d identified by H(d).
Post Condition new transaction claiming the availabiliy of H(d) with a
modified list of readers is committed to the blockchain, and all storage
nodes store a data element d identified by H(d).
4.3.2 Upload
This operation is used when a client wants to store data in the system. In
order to reduce the impact on the clients bandwidth, it is only required
to upload the data to a single storage node. This storage node will then
disseminate the data to the rest of the storage nodes. The necessary pre-
and post-conditions are defined as follows:
Pre Condition a client wanting to store data element d with an unique
content identifier, H(d), and no data element d′ with content identifier
H(d) is stored on any storage node by the client.
Post Condition a transaction stating the availability of H(d) is committed
to the blockchain, and data element d has been disseminated to all
storage nodes.
4.3.3 Download
When a client wants to download a data element, it must be recognized
as a reader for that particular element. This is the only operation which
does change the systems state. Upon receiving the data element, the client
is able to verify its authenticity by recalculating the content identifier and
comparing it to the one published on the blockchain. The necessary pre- and
post-conditions are defined as follows:
Pre Condition there is a transaction committed to the blockchain claiming
the availability of some data element d identified by H(d) for which
the client is identified as a reader, and all storage nodes store a data
element d identified by H(d).
Post Condition verification of authenticity of the received data element,
d′ such that H(d′) = H(d).
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4.3.4 Delete
An owner of a data element wanting a data element to become unavailable
may use the Delete operation. As the blockchain is append-only, it is not
possible to remove the previous entry stating the availability of the data
element, rather the operation publishes a new entry stating that the data
element is unavailable. The storage nodes will delete the data element. The
necessary pre- and post-conditions are defined as follows:
Pre Condition there is a transaction committed to the blockchain claiming
the availability of some data element d identified by H(d) for which the
client is identified as an owner, and all storage nodes store a data
element d identified by H(d).
Post Condition new transaction claiming the unavailability of H(d) is com-
mitted to the blockchain, and that no storage node hold any data ele-
ment d identified by H(d).
4.3.5 Verify Storage
Long time archival storage is challenging because over the course of time the
data will have to be administered and moved to new hardware as the old is no
longer suitable. This means that data loss and data corruption may happen
due to management errors or hardware failure, which could go undetected, at
least until the data is accessed. This is a major challenge, as large amounts
of data may rarely, if ever, be accessed. In addition, accessing entire files
is expensive in terms of I/O, especially since the performance of magnetic
disks has not improved as rapidly as its capacity [45]. For this reason, the
storage must be able to provide non-reputable proofs of their data possession
on demand, without accessing the entire file.
Due to using a permissioned blockchain with controlled membership and
without having any monetary reward, the storage node can not attempt
Sybil-, outsourcing- or generation-attacks [13].
To assess the probability that a client can retrieve its data at some random
time in the future, an important consideration in this probabilistic scheme is
how many samples are needed for every challenge. We deem a good proba-
bilistic guarantee to have at least 99% chance to detect a modification of 1%.
In the following equations we let n denote the total number of file blocks, t the
number of faulty blocks, c the number of unique samples in the challenge, X
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the discrete random variable which represents the number of samples found
to be faulty and finally Px the probability that at least one faulty block is
found. A similar derivation can be found in [17].






If we allow for repetition in the samples, we can simplify this to;



















If we input the numbers for detecting a 1% modification with 99% probability,







) = 458.21. (4.5)
As seen, the minimum number of samples required to achieve a 99%
probability to detect a modification of 1% is independent of the total number
of file blocks n. Therefore we believe that creating challenges which span
several files would be advantageous. In addition, an interesting property of
the schemes in [17, 18] is public verifiability, which in the context of the
schemes means that anyone can issue storage challenges, even those who
do not possess the stored data. We believe this would further increase the
confidence in the system. The necessary pre- and post-conditions are defined
as follows:
Pre Condition there is a transaction committed to the blockchain claiming
the availability of some data element d identified by H(d).
Post Condition new transaction proving the availability of data element d
is committed to the blockchain.
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A client concerned with data privacy may want to encrypt their data before
uploading. It is left to the client to decide which algorithm that is best
suited, as the protocol is not influenced by this. When it comes to sharing
the content, and key distribution, the Change Access operation allows a
decryption key to be specified for every additional reader.
Obviously publishing the decryption key directly on the blockchain is not
a good idea. Therefore, the default mode is to encrypt the data using a
symmetric cipher such as AES, and then encrypt the encryption key once
for each additional reader using their respective public keys, as shown in
Table 4.1. The symmetric key should be randomly generated and never be
re-used. This allows only those in possession of the private key to decipher
the data. A potential weakness with such a scheme is that a reader may
share the symmetric key with an unauthorized third-party. However, this is
not considered as the reader may also share the plaintext data.
Chapter 5
Implementation
This section will explain the prototype developed during the course of this
project. Due to the very nature of a prototype, the details may differ from
the idealistic view given in Chapter 4. To save valuable time the choice was
made to build the implementation on top of existing open-source architecture.
For the ledger nodes Tendermint [30, 31, 33] was used, and for the storage
nodes IPFS [28, 32] was used. The first section will give an overview how
each of the five operation required to operate the system was implemented.
To aid in the explainations, a sequence diagram will be presented for each
operation. The next sections will describe inner workings of the prototype in
more detail. To augment the textual descriptions, algorithms in pseudocode
will be presented. The programming language used in this project is Go.
The complete implementation code may be found in Appendix A.
5.1 Operations
Due to the blockchain being append-only, each time we want to change the
state we have to append a new transaction to the ledger. We design the
transactions in such a way that only the latest committed transaction should
be considered when determining the state of a data element. Throughout the
detailed description of the operations this will be referred to as retrieving the
prevailing block, meaning the block which contains the last transaction that
affects the data element.
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5.1.1 Upload Data
Figure 5.1 shows the sequence diagram for the Upload operation. The pro-
tocol starts by having the client upload their data to any storage node. As
noted in Section 4.4, the protocol is not influenced by whether the data is
encrypted or not. For this reason, data encryption is seen as an orthogonal
issue, and is not implemented in this prototype. Further work in Chapter 7
discusses the implementation of data encryption in more detail.
Once the storage node has received the data, it will verify that the sender
is a registered client of the system. In addition it will verify that the reported
CID and data length is the same as the sender claims. Lastly it will check
that the CID is not already stored by the system. The reasoning behind the
duplicate check is due to a limitation of the prototype, as it does not support
multiple owners for the same data. Given all the conditional verifications
pass, the storage node will return a digitally signed envelope containing the
users transaction. Though this does not make it impossible to falsely report
uploaded data to the ledger node, it forces them to provide a non-reputable
proof of the transaction.
After the client receives confirmation from the storage node, it will relay
this confirmation to a single ledger node. As discussed in Sections 3.2 and
5.4, the ledger node will verify the transaction and then relay it to the other
ledger nodes to achieve consensus for its validity. Both the client and storage
node will now wait until the new block containing the upload transaction is
committed, at which point the client will generate and save metadata related
to the uploaded data, and the storage node will issue the Pin-operation in
order to distribute the uploaded data to the other storage nodes.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the responsibility of issuing storage challenges
is left up to the client. Therefore the next natural step would be to proceed
to the verify storage operation, but this is optional.
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Figure 5.1: Sequence flow for the upload operation.
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5.1.2 Download Data
When the client wants to download some piece of stored data, it will issue
a signed request containing the data’s CID to a storage node. The storage
node will verify that the sender of the transaction is a registered client of
the system. Then it will fetch the prevailing block for the CID, check the
validity of the block, and then verify that the sender has access as a reader
of this data. See Algorithm 3 for the details on access verification.
Given that all verifications pass, the storage node will send the data back
to the client. The client can then easily verify the integrity of the data by
matching its hash to the CID. Figure 5.2 shows a sequence diagram for the
download operation. As the figure shows, the download operation does not
change the system’s state, so there is no need to achieve consensus amongst
the nodes. At the same time, it would be easy for a single malicious storage
node to withhold data. The protocol imposes no limitation on the number of
download requests a client may issue, and to which storage nodes, therefore
if a client experiences a non-compliant storage node, it may simply issue the
same request to another.








Verify access in block
Send data
Verify integrity
Figure 5.2: Sequence flow for the download operation.










Figure 5.3: Sequence flow for the delete data operation.
5.1.3 Delete Data
The delete data operation starts by having the client issue a signed request
containing the CID it wants to delete from the system. The ledger node which
receives the request will verify the signature, and that the sender is registered
as a client in the system. Then it will use the isOwner function as described
in Algorithm 3 to verify that the sender is the owner of this data. Given that
these condition pass, the ledger node will add the transaction to its mempool
and broadcast it to the other ledger nodes. Once a new block containing this
transaction is committed to the ledger, all storage nodes will Unpin the data,
so that it is no longer guaranteed to stay in persistent storage. Figure 5.3
shows the sequence diagram for the operation.







New block New block
Distribute metadata (opt)
Figure 5.4: Sequence flow for the change content access operation.
5.1.4 Change Access
Figure 5.4 shows a sequence diagram for the change access operation. The
steps are identical to the delete data operation up until a new block is com-
mitted. The difference being that after a block containing a transaction
which changes access on a CID is broadcast, no storage nodes will take any
action. The client might however want to distribute the metadata and/or
encryption keys for any new readers to the data it might have added. This
is however optional, and is left out of this prototype.
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5.1.5 Verify Storage
The sequence diagram for the verify storage operation is shown in Figure 5.5.
The implementation in the prototype is a simplified version of the one de-
scribed in [17], with the main difference being that raw content data is stored
as part of the metadata. The public verifiability described in Section 2.8.1
is left for future work.
Though not strictly necessary to execute the protocol, normally the client
will have uploaded some data and generated and stored its metadata prior
to issuing a storage challenge. Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode for the
sampleData method, and the rest of the proof-of-storage implementation.
Given that the client has stored the metadata, a challenge is generated
using the generateChallenge method. The method starts by loading the
metadata which contains the samples into a variable. It will then randomly
pick out the desired number of samples to fill a challenge, placing the indices
in one array, and the values in another array. The array of indices is the
generated challenge, and the hash of the array of values will be the proof.
The generated challenge is then signed by the client and sent as a query
to a single ledger node. Upon receiving the challenge, the ledger node will
initially verify the origin of the challenge, and given that the sender is recog-
nized as a client, it will generate another challenge to be sent to the storage
nodes. In order to generate a random challenge, the ledger node needs to
know the length of the data. This was previously recorded on the blockchain
when the data was initially uploaded. The generation is accomplished us-
ing the generateRandomChallenge method, which simply returns an array of
random integers.
Then both the clients challenge and the ledgers challenge are broadcast
to every storage node in the system. The storage node will generate a proof
of storage with proveChallenge. This method will put the bytes of the stored
data in the same order as requested by the challenge and then hash it. The
reason for using a cryptographic hash to represent the proof instead of the
raw data bytes as suggested in the strawman solution in [17] is that it is
designed to be a one-way function, and thus the proof can be put on the
blockchain without sacrificing the clients privacy.
The ledger node will collect responses from storage nodes into an array
as they come in. Storage nodes have a maximum amount of time in which
they will have to respond to the challenge, else they will be considered faulty.
Once the ledger node receives the expected number of responses, it will move
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on with the protocol. The array of proofs will be signed by the ledger node
and broadcast as a transaction. Given that the signatures can be verified by
the other ledger nodes, this transaction will be included into the mempool
and ultimately contained in a block.
Once the new block containing the proof is committed, the client will
verify the proofs that the storage nodes responded with. First it will check
if the proofs of the challenge it generated previously is as expected. For
the randomly generated challenge of the ledger node it will check if all of
the storage nodes responded with the same proof. For the challenge the
client generated, it is easy to check which storage nodes were able to prove
possession, but for the challenge generated by the ledger node it will have
to rely on the majority result to identify faulty storage nodes. It is also
reasonable to assume that if a storage node knows that it is unable to respond
correctly to a challenge, it may simply opt to not respond at all. Therefore
the client should also pay attention to which nodes actually did respond.
Note that since the client interacts with a single ledger node using the
query connection, it will not interact with the consensus engine. If the request
was sent as a regular transaction to the mempool, the protocol would have
to be drastically changed; firstly because of the randomness of the extended
challenge, and also the fact that more than 2
3
of the ledger nodes would
have to receive the exact same response. A single malicious storage node
could simply equivocate by responding differently to every ledger node in an
attempt to halt the system. The protocol is however reliant on the honesty
of a single ledger node to actually relay the challenges, record the proofs and
broadcast them in a transaction. Due to the strength of the cryptographic
primitives it may not reliably modify the proofs. One of the design goals
of proof-of-storage is that it should be computationally cheap to both issue
challenges, and to prove them. There is no limitations on the number of
challenges a client can issue, so an unsatisfied client may issue a new challenge
to other ledger nodes.
If we keep issuing challenges generated from the same pool of samples,
sooner or later a malicious prover would be able to reconstruct the entire
stored metadata. Of course the challenges with unknown solutions coun-
teract this, but a client might not be satisfied with this. Therefore, in our
prototype we find it necessary that a client can expect a pool of samples
to be known by the storage nodes no earlier than a year, if one challenge is
issued every day. To calculate how many samples should be generated we use
the coupon collectors problem [48] which gives us an expected value for how
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many samples must be drawn before you have seen all in the pool. Through
trial and error, we were able to find that 16400 samples gives just over a year
of daily storage challenges, assuming each challenge contains 460 randomly
drawn samples. Equation 5.1 shows the calculations.











t = 168629/460 = 366, 58 (5.2)




upon event 〈cor, Init〉 do
numSamples := 16400 ;
chalLength := 460 ;





while |sample.indices| < numSamples do
index := trg.NewInt(0, max );
sample.indices := sample.indices ∪ index ;
sample.values := sample.values ∪ data[index];
return sample;
function generateRandomChallenge(CID) returns Array is
chal := ∅;
max := getDataLen(CID);
while |chal | < chalLength do
chal := chal ∪ trg.NewInt(0, max );
return chal ;
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while |chal | < chalLength do
index := trg.NewInt(0, length(sample.values));
proof := proof ∪ sample.values[index];
chal := chal ∪ sample.indices[index];
return [chal, cry.hash(proof)];
function proveChallenge(challenge, data) returns String is
proof := ∅;
forall index ∈ challenge do
proof := proof ∪ data[index];
return cry.hash(data);













Figure 5.5: Sequence flow for the verify storage operation.
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5.2 Access Control
Membership in the prototype is defined by the distribution of public keys,
and the configuration file which associates the public key with an access level.
There are 3 access levels; Client, Storage node, and Ledger node. Each mem-
ber is attached to the 128-bit MD5 [19] checksum of the public key. The
motivation for using MD5 even though it is no longer considered collision
resistant [20] is that it’s short and therefore easily readable. In a produc-
tion environment, a stronger hashing function such as SHA256 should be
considered.
The algorithm used for generating the private and public key pair is
expected to be RSA [9]. In addition the public key has to be encoded using
the DER [40] format, and the private key in the PKCS #8 syntax [41].
The prototype does not enforce any bounds on the key length, though in
our tests 4096 bit was used for all keys. At the time of writing this is
well above NIST’s minimum recommended key length for achieving 128-bit
security strength [42] for RSA. In Appendix A an installation guide which
details how suitable keys can be generated can be found in the same archive
as the program code.
Algorithm 7 gives a simplified pseudocode of how the prototype uses dig-
ital signatures. Algorithm 3 gives the pseudocode for how a client’s access
towards a specific CID is determined. The prototype defines three levels of
content access; None, Reader and Owner. The owner is defined to always be
the one that originally uploaded the data. A reader is one or several identi-
ties that is allowed to download the data, but have no administrative access
towards the data. Note that there is not added any functionality to distribute
the locally stored metadata between an owner and the readers. Additionally,
as data encryption is considered an orthogonal issue, encryption keys must
also be shared in some other way.
Algorithm: 3 Access verification
function isOwner(block, identity, CID) returns Boolean is
forall tx ∈ block do
if CID 6= tx.CID then
continue;
if tx.type = UPLOAD ∧ identity = tx.identity then
return True;
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else if tx.type = DELETE then
return False;
else if tx.type = ACCESS ∧ identity = tx.identity then
return True;
return False;
function isReader(block, identity, CID) returns Boolean is
forall tx ∈ block do
if CID 6= tx.CID then
continue;
if tx.type = UPLOAD ∧ identity = tx.identity then
return True;
else if tx.type = DELETE then
return False;
else if tx.type = ACCESS then




This section will describe the implementation of the storage node. A storage
node consists of three main components; IPFS and IPFS-Cluster developed
by Protocol Labs, as well as a proxy built on top to both restrict access to
the API and to add additional functionality. IPFS and IPFS-Cluster are
discussed in Section 3.1. This section will give a detailed explanation of the
proxy component, and how it relates to the other two. A simple illustration
is shown in Figure 5.6.
The main motivation for using IPFS in the prototype is that all data
is content-addressable (CAS) by its unique, immutable CID. In the context
of having an immutable link to the blockchain this is much preferred over
location-addressing, as this would limit the flexibility of churn of storage
nodes. As noted in Section 3.1, the Unpin operation does not explicitly
delete the data, however by adding yet another layer on top of IPFS-Cluster,
the data will not be available for download, as long as the node is not acting






Figure 5.6: Storage node architecture.
maliciously.
Algorithm 4 gives the pseudocode of the proxy component of the storage
node. The node receives updates about new blocks being committed to the
ledger using the publish-subscribe pattern. The current prototype will only
subscribe to a single ledger node, which is quite vulnerable as this ledger
node may act malicious by not publishing any new blocks, thereby making the
storage node lag behind. An obvious solution to this would be to concurrently
subscribe to more than f ledger nodes, or to have the storage node partake
as a non-validator.
Once the storage node hears of a new block, it will immediately validate
the cryptographic primitives of the block. Note that the signatures contained
in a block actually validate the previous block in the chain [31], therefore a
more conservative approach would be not to trust any block which does not
have at least one valid parent. The storage node will keep track of the last
block height it processed so that every block will be processed in order. If
it hears of a block which has a height that is more than one higher than the
previous processed one, it will request the missing blocks before processing.
The processing of a block is rather simple, as it mainly involves the iter-
ation of the transactions contained in the block. If the transaction is of type
UPLOAD, the storage will attempt to Pin that CID. Similarly if the type is
DELETE, the node will attempt to Unpin that CID. After iterating all the
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transactions, the last processed height variable is updated.
The proxy offers five endpoints in total; Get, Status, StatusAll, AddNoPin,
and Challenge. The endpoints Status and StatusAll are only accessible for
registered clients of the system and are used to get a status report of the
stored data. The Get endpoint is used when a client requests to download
data. The proxy will only let a client download data if it can verify that it
has the role of reader at minimum. When a client wants to upload data, it
will send it to the storage node using the AddNoPin endpoint. The storage
node will verify that the reported CID and data length is equal to what the
client claims. Given this holds, it will store the data in temporary storage
until the CID is recorded on the blockchain, at which point it will Pin the
data. Finally there is the Challenge endpoint, which is used for generating
proofs of storage and used in the Verify Storage operation.








upon event 〈pro, Init〉 do
identity = cry.loadCertificate(self);
seenBlockHeight = 0 ;
clients, ledgernodes, storagenodes := [⊥]N ;
LoadIdentities(clients, ledgernodes, storagenodes);
upon event 〈cor, NewBlock | block 〉 do
if validate(block) 6= True then
return;
if block.height > seenBlockHeight + 1 then
trigger 〈cor, RequestBlocks | [seenBlockHeight]〉
return;
else if block.height 6= seenBlockHeight + 1 then
return; // Previously processed.
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forall tx ∈ block do
if tx.type = UPLOAD ∧ identity = tx.storNode then
icl.Pin(tx.CID);
else if tx.type = DELETE then
icl.Unpin(tx.CID);
seenBlockHeight := block.height ;
upon event 〈pro, Get | node, [tx] 〉 do
if hasAccess(tx, clients) 6= True then
return;
block := getPrevailingBlock(tx.CID);
if validate(block) ∧ acv.isReader(block, tx.identity, tx.CID) then
trigger 〈node, GetResponse | [self, tx, ico.getData(tx.CID)]〉
upon event 〈pro, Status | node, [tx] 〉 do
if hasAccess(tx, clients ∪ ledgerNodes) 6= True then
return;
trigger 〈node, StatusResponse | [self, icl.status(tx.CID)]〉
upon event 〈pro, StatusAll | node, [tx] 〉 do
if hasAccess(tx, clients ∪ ledgerNodes) 6= True then
return;
trigger 〈node, StatusAllResponse | [self, icl.statusAll()]〉
upon event 〈pro, AddNoPin | node, [tx, data] 〉 do
if hasAccess(tx, clients) 6= True then
return;
if tx.CID 6= ico.hash(data) ∨ tx.length 6= data.length then
return;
if ico.status(tx.CID) = False then
ico.addNoPin(data);
trigger 〈node, AddNoPinResponse | [self,cry.sign([tx.CID,tx.length],identity)]〉
upon event 〈pro, Challenge | node, [tx] 〉 do
if hasAccess(tx, clients ∪ ledgerNodes) 6= True then
return;
data := ico.getData(tx.CID);
proof := pos.proveChallenge(tx.challenge, data);
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trigger 〈node, ChallengeProof | [self,cry.sign([tx.CID,challenge, proof],identity)]〉
function hasAccess(tx, openFor) returns Boolean is
return cry.verifysignature(tx ) ∧ tx.identity ∈ openFor ;
function getPrevailingBlock(cid) returns Block is
trigger 〈cor, Query | [self, ’/prevailingheight’, tx.CID] 〉;
upon event 〈self, QueryResponse | cor, [height] 〉 do
trigger 〈cor, GetBlock | [self, height] 〉;
upon event 〈self, BlockResponse | cor, [block] 〉 do
return block ;
5.4 Ledger Node
This section describe how the Tendermint application was implemented. In
particular, we will focus on the consensus methods CheckTx and DeliverTx,
as well as the query methods Challenge and Prevailingheight. Algorithm 5
gives the pseudocode for the implementation.
To establish communication with the consensus engine (Tendermint Core),
Tendermint supports two solutions [31]. The first, and default one is raw
sockets and the second is gRPC. The choice for the prototype fell on gRPC
as this made is easier to both create new and extend existing message types.
The voting power for each validator was kept uniform.
To prevent denial of service attacks on the mempool [33], we implement
filtering on which transactions are valid. In addition, by adding unique se-
quence numbers to transactions, we can employ exactly-once semantics to
prevent replay attacks.
When implementing the CheckTx and DeliverTx methods, it is crucial
that their execution is deterministic [31]. Depending on the severity of the
non-determinism it may be impossible for the protocol to reach consensus.
The safest approach is to avoid all sources of non-determinism. This includes,
but is not limited to: true random generators, any form of race conditions
and reliance on the system clock. It is also important to consider the details
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of the programming language, as some sources of non-determinism may be
more subtle, such as map iteration in Go. This is the reasoning behind the
sort operation in the stringify method of Algorithm 7, as it sorts all the keys
in lexicographic order.
Any time a new transaction is validated against CheckTx, it will first
verify the digital signature of the transaction, and as discussed in Section 5.2,
that the sender is a member of the system. Given the verification passes, the
rest of the validation depends on the type of transaction. The Verify type
is the most simple, as the only additional condition is that the sender must
have the ledger node access level. The Delete and Access types both require
that the sender is the owner of the content. The Upload type requires that
the sender has the client access level. If the type-dependent check passes,
CheckTx will return an OK response, which means that the transaction is
valid, and can be included in the mempool.
As elaborated on in Chapter 7, the BeginBlock and EndBlock have been
omitted in this prototype, and therefore we are only concerned with Deliv-
erTx once a new block is committed. For every new block, the transactions
will be iterated and DeliverTx executed one time for each. The executed
code depends on the type of transaction. For the Delete and Access types,
the map which keeps track of block height is relevant for any CID will be
updated. Transactions of the Verify type have no additional logic. When
it comes to transactions with type Upload, simple metadata containing the
file size of the uploaded data will be written to persistent storage. The file
size is later used to define the interval of the random challenges. Note that
by having the client collude with the storage node it is possible to trick the
ledger nodes into committing a block containing erroneous CID or file size,
as the uploaded data never passes through the ledger node. However, this
would immediately be detected after the first proof-of-storage challenge, as
a valid proof holds both the CID and file size. Due to the non-repudiation
property of digital signatures, it would be trivial to prove which client and
storage nodes private key signed the transaction.
Tendermint offers a Query connection, which allows the interaction with
the associated application without engaging consensus. Queries are filtered
by their path. The prototype contains two query paths; prevailingHeight and
challenge. Prevailingheight is by far the simplest one, as it will simply return
the block height which should be considered when processing a given CID.
Note that, as stated in Section 5.3, simply querying a single ledger node is
prone to malicious behavior. An alternative solution would be to have all
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actors keep up with the blockchain and thus keep this data structure them-
selves. The challenge path is used when a client wants to issue a proof of
storage request for some previously uploaded data. The input to the chal-
lenge query must be a digitally signed storage challenge by a registered client.
In addition to the clients storage challenge, the ledger node will generate a
fully random challenge - of which it does not know the proof for. The rea-
soning behind the random challenge is discussed in Section 5.1.5. The two
challenges are then issued to all the storage nodes known to the ledger node.
The execution will then halt until enough storage proofs have been returned,
or the requests have timed out. All the proofs are then collected, and then
digitally signed in a transaction and broadcast as a new transaction to the
network. Once this transaction is recorded on the ledger, everyone can see
what proofs the storage nodes responded with. Note that due to the as-
sumed strength of the cryptographic primitives, the single ledger node may
not modify the proofs. The ledger node may however act malicious by sim-
ply not broadcasting the proofs, therefore the client should issue the same
challenge to multiple ledger nodes. In the current implementation it is also
possible for the client to issue storage challenges directly to the storage node,
but these would not be recorded on the ledger.






upon event 〈app, Init〉 do
prevailingBlock := [⊥]N ;
clients, ledgernodes, storagenodes := [⊥]N ;
LoadIdentities(clients, ledgernodes, storagenodes);
proofs := ([]N);
upon event 〈app, ChallengeProof | stornode, [proof, chal] 〉 do
if cry.verifysignature(proof ) 6= True ∨ stornode ∈ proofs[chal] then
return;
append(proofs[chal], [stornode, proof]);
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upon event 〈app, ChallengeProof | stornode, [Timeout, chal] 〉 do
append(proofs[chal], [stornode, Timeout]);
function Query(path, DATA) returns String is
if path = ’/challenge’ then





forall storNode ∈ storageNodes do
trigger 〈storNode, Challenge | [DATA.tx.challenge]〉;
trigger 〈storNode, Challenge | [rndChal]〉;
upon |proofs[DATA.tx.challenge]| = |storageNodes| ∧ |proofs[rndChal]|
= |storageNodes| do
trigger 〈Broadcast | [NewTx, proofs]〉;
return ’Proofs recorded’ ;




function queryStor(node, DATA, endpoint) returns String is
trigger 〈node, Proxy | [endpoint, DATA]〉;
upon event 〈app, StorageResponse | node, [response] 〉 do
return response;
function CheckTx(tx ) returns Boolean is
return cry.verifysignature(tx ) ∧ validateTx(tx );
function DeliverTx(tx ) returns Boolean is
return doTxWork(tx );
function validateTx(tx ) returns Boolean is
if tx.type = UPLOAD then
if tx.identity /∈ clients ∨
queryStor(tx.storNode, tx.CID, status) 6= True then
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return False;
return True;
else if tx.type = DELETE then
block := prevailingBlock[tx.CID];
return acv.isOwner(block, tx.identity, tx.CID);
else if tx.type = ACCESS then
block := prevailingBlock[tx.CID];
return acv.isOwner(block, tx.identity, tx.CID);
else if tx.type = VERIFY then
return tx.identity ∈ ledgerNodes ;
else
return False;
function doTxWork(tx ) returns Boolean is
if tx.type = UPLOAD then
pos.WriteSimpleMetadata(tx.CID, tx.length);
prevailingBlock[tx.CID] = cor.height + 1 ;
return True;
else if tx.type = DELETE then
prevailingBlock[tx.CID] = cor.height + 1 ;
return True;
else if tx.type = ACCESS then
prevailingBlock[tx.CID] = cor.height + 1 ;
return True;





The pseudocode for a client who can interact with the system is shown in
Algorithm 6. In addition to the the five operations discussed in Section 5.1,
it has three more commands; View blockchain, List metadata and Storage
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node status. As they don’t involve consensus, these are omitted from the
pseudocode in Algorithm 6, but can be found in the attached program code
in Appendix A.
It is not essential that a client connects to the current proposer, as once
a transaction is passed into the mempool, it will be gossiped to through the
mempool reactor to be cached in the mempool of all the validators [33]. Any
validator which has the transaction in its mempool may propose it in due
time. One could however argue that preferential broadcasting to the next
proposer may reduce the block commit time.
When the client wants to upload data, it will input its local path into the
application, including optional fields for name and description. The name
and description fields are only used as part of the locally stored metadata.
The CID and length of the data is then calculated and digitally signed, and
then sent alongside the data to a storage node. Once the client receives a
response from the storage node that the upload was successful, it will verify
the validity of the response and then relay it to a ledger node. Note that only
the storage nodes response is sent to the ledger node, and not the actual file
data. The client will subscribe to the publication of new blocks, and once
the upload transaction is committed, it will generate a storage sample of the
data, and store it alongside the metadata.
To issue a storage challenge, the client will have to input the CID of the
data it wants to challenge. Then generateChallenge of Algorithm 2 will use
the previously stored sample to generate a storage challenge. The challenge
is signed and then sent to a ledger node in a query. When a new block which
contains all the storage nodes proofs for this challenge is committed, the
client will verify that the proofs are correct. Should the proof be incorrect,
or some storage node did not respond, it would be appropriate for the client
to either issue a new challenge or trigger some kind of suspect protocol. This
is however left to further work.
The other operations mainly involve signing the application input and











upon event 〈pro, Init〉 do
identity = cry.loadCertificate(self );
challenges := ([]N);
uploads := ([]N);
upon event 〈cor, NewBlock | block 〉 do
forall tx ∈ block do
if tx.type = VERIFY ∧ tx.challenge ∈ challenges then
myProof := challenges[tx.challenge];
forall proof ∈ tx.proof such that proof 6= myProof do
suspect(proof.identity);
else if tx.type = UPLOAD ∧ tx.CID ∈ uploads then
sample := pos.sampleData(uploads[tx.CID]);
pos.saveMetadata(tx.CID, sample);
upon event 〈cli, Challenge | CID 〉
[chal, proof] := pos.generateChallenge(cid);
append(challenges[chal], proof );
trigger 〈cor, Query | [self, ’/challenge’,cry.sign([CID, chal], identity)] 〉;
upon event 〈cli, Upload | data 〉
CID := ico.hash(data);
tx := cry.sign([CID, length(data)], identity);
trigger 〈ipo, AddNoPin | [self, tx, data, identity] 〉;
upon event 〈ipo, AddNoPinResponse | ipoTx 〉 do
if cry.verifysignature(ipoTx ) ∧ ipoTx.CID = CID ∧ ipoTx.length =
length(data) then
append(uploads[tx.CID], data);
trigger 〈cor, UPLOAD | [NewTx, ipoTx]〉;
upon event 〈cli, Get | CID 〉
tx := cry.sign([CID], identity);
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trigger 〈ipo, Get | [self, tx] 〉;
upon event 〈ipo, GetResponse | q, [node, tx, data] 〉
if tx.CID := ico.hash(data) then
saveData(tx.CID, data);
upon event 〈cli, Delete | CID 〉
tx := cry.sign([CID], identity);
trigger 〈cor , DELETE | [NewTx, tx] 〉;
upon event 〈cli, Access | [CID, readers] 〉
tx := cry.sign([CID, readers], identity);
trigger 〈cor, ACCESS | [self, tx] 〉;
5.6 Datastructures
Figure 5.7 shows some of the data structures used in the prototype. At the
top we have SignedStruct, which is used to represent digitally signed data.
For better or worse, it uses an empty interface in the Base field to hold the
value of any type. Note that Signature holds the signature for the hash of
Base, not the value of Base itself. Two of the types that the prototype use
in Base are StorageChallenge and Transaction.
Transaction is the data structure used to represent all requests to the
ledger nodes, and may be contained in a block on the blockchain. It also has
an empty interface that can be used to hold the value of any type. In the
most simple cases it will simply hold a string, whilst in other cases it holds
complex structures such as an array of storage proofs. Some data structures
also have another field, Nonce, which is used to deter replay attacks, and
provides exactly-once semantics. Note however, that the implementation
of replay-mitigation in the prototype does not store anything to persistent
storage, and is therefore vulnerable after a restart of the node.















Figure 5.7: Datastructures used in the prototype.
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5.7 Cryptography






function verifysignature(tx ) returns Boolean is
return rsa.verify(hash(tx.base), tx.signature, getPubKey(tx.identity));
function sign(data, identity) returns String is
return rsa.sign(hash(data), getPrivKey(identity));
function stringify(data) returns String is
if |fields(data)| = 0 then
return data;
output := ”;
forall field ∈ sort(data) do
output := output + stringify(field);
return output ;




We attempt to answer research question RQ2 by evaluating scalability of
the prototype using 3 different configurations of quorum sizes. First we have
a small network with 7 ledger nodes and 3 storage nodes, then a medium
network with 16 ledger nodes and 9 storage nodes and finally a large net-
work with 25 ledger nodes and 15 storage nodes. To evaluate, we test how
long it takes for the network to disseminate data after the client uploads it.
Three different data sizes are used, 10MB, 100MB and 500MB. We do 20
experiments for each data size in every configuration. To issue requests to
the network we use a single client. The complete experimental data can be
found in Appendix B.
6.1 Experimental Setup
Experiments are conducted on virtual machines on Amazon Elastic Compute
Cloud. The virtual machines reside in the same data center in the Frankfurt
region. We spread the virtual machines out in the three availability zones
offered to reduce the likelihood that multiple virtual machines will reside on
the same physical server. The virtual machines are configured as t2.medium,
which has 2 vCPU, 4 GiB of RAM and 30 GiB of SSD storage. The operating
system used is Ubuntu Server 16.04 LTS (HVM). Tests are run using the
following versions; Tendermint 0.19.2, IPFS 0.4.15-rc1, IPFS-Cluster 0.3.5
and Go 1.10.1.
To configure the network, we generate a public/private key pair for every
node. The public key is shared with every other node on the network. To
76
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION 77
configure the ledger nodes, we list all of them as validators and give them
uniform voting power upon genesis of the blockchain. The storage nodes are
configured to have the same secret key to ensure secure communication [32].
In order to reduce errors in the measurements we dedicate one server as
a Network Time Protocol (NTP) server [68], and then make all the nodes
synchronize their local time to the server. The accuracy of the nodes can be
kept within one millisecond in a LAN environment [69]. As our measurements
of Pin time are only recorded in seconds, the time difference between nodes
is several orders of magnitude lower and should thus not impact the results.
6.2 Data Dissemination Results
For each measurement we start the time as soon as the client initiates the
Upload operation. The first data point is block commit time, then every
contiguous data point is when a storage node has completed the Pin oper-
ation. Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 show the mean time for data dissemination in
a small, medium and large network, respectively. As seen in Table 6.1, the
time before all storage nodes have completed the Pin operation increase far
more rapidly than the time before a quorum of nodes have completed the
operation. This is due to the last few nodes often taking a long time before
completing the operation. This is also shown in the error bars of the figures.
Indeed, in one instance the Pin operation ran for over 1 hour before printing
an error message. As this is most likely due to a bug, we have excluded this
result from the measurements. We also noticed a time discrepancy between
a storage node having the data element in storage and completing the Pin
operation. However, we were unable to perform any measurement to confirm
this finding.
As expected, the number of ledger nodes did not impact data dissemi-
nation speed. As noted in Chapter 5, a block may be committed as soon
as one storage node reports having stored the data. This means that the
data transfer speed between the client and the storage node is the dominant
factor.
The number of ledger nodes would likely affect performance if multiple
Upload operations where concurrently being executed. Experimental results
for throughput and latency for Tendermint can be found in [33], which states
that Tendermint can achieve thousands of transactions per second with up
to 64 ledger nodes.
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Figure 6.1: Data dissemination after initiating an upload in a small network
consisting of 7 ledger nodes and 3 storage nodes. Each data point is the
mean of 20 experiments. The horizontal error bars show the standard error.
Data size 10 MB




Data size 100 MB




Data size 500 MB




Table 6.1: Mean time in seconds for data dissemination for different network
sizes. Quorum Pin means once over half of the storage nodes has the data
in persistent storage.
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Figure 6.2: Data dissemination after initiating an upload in a medium net-
work consisting of 16 ledger nodes and 9 storage nodes. Each data point is
the mean of 20 experiments. The horizontal error bars show the standard
error.
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Figure 6.3: Data dissemination after initiating an upload in a large network
consisting of 25 ledger nodes and 15 storage nodes. Each data point is the
mean of 20 experiments. The horizontal error bars show the standard error.
Chapter 7
Further work
This chapter provides some suggestions and thoughts for improvement for
the work presented in this thesis.
Audit Log By modifying the Download operation to publish an entry into
the ledger, the system would be able to provide chronological documen-
tation of each data access. Such a feature might be of particular interest
for a system dealing with medical records or financial transactions.
Data Encryption The client component should offer support for encrypt-
ing data using some symmetric cipher. To allow for multiple readers of
the encrypted data, the encryption key should be encrypted using the
readers public key, and then published on the blockchain. Additionally,
means for a system operator to hold a master key should be studied
further.
Secure Signing Devices To hold the clients public/private key pair and
digitally sign data, a secure signing device could be used. Additionally,
this could require some biometric input such as a fingerprint to be
activated.
Non-Validators The storage nodes should subscribe to multiple ledger nodes
in order to reliably receive updates of new blocks being committed. As
an alternative in Tendermint, the storage node could be added as a
non-validator.
Availability Numbers The availability numbers for each component should
be studied further, for example by modeling them in a Markov model.
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Public Verifiability Of Storage Nodes The prototype uses a primitive
proof-of-storage algorithm which only allows owners of the stored data
to issue storage challenges. Using a more sophisticated approach as de-
scribed in Section 4.3.5 would allow anyone to issue storage challenges.
Simultaneous Storage Challenges Currently each storage challenge is done
on a per-CID level. If a challenge could span multiple CIDs, this would
reduce the amount of data being published on the blockchain.
Smart Contracts By adding the possibility of clients specifying smart con-
tacts as part of the operations, advanced features and great flexibility
could be gained. The appropriate execution model for smart contracts
should be studied further. Some of the features that could be specified
are time limited sharing of data and requiring multiple parties to sign
an operation (e.g. delete).
Suspect Protocol Currently, it is possible to detect erroneous storage proofs
by looking at the blockchain. These detections should be used to sus-
pect and notify a system operator of a potential faulty storage node.
Additionally, it should be possible to trigger a suspect protocol if either
a storage node is refusing to accept uploaded data, or sends erroneous
data when downloading.
Multiple Owners Currently the prototype expects exactly one owner for
each CID. Further study is required to devise a way to support multiple
owners uploading the same data.
Dynamic Membership In the prototype each participant is given their
membership view upon initialization. Compared to ledger- and storage
nodes, we expect clients to have by far the highest churn rate, and
therefore want to add functionality which allows for modification in
client membership without requiring the restart of nodes. In addition,
we think a study of repair mechanisms after ledger- or storage node
failure would be interesting.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This project initially had a very large scope with several difficult tasks, so
this thesis should only be seen as preliminary work for the project as a whole.
In this thesis we were able to reduce the scope of the project, and focus on the
main task which was to design a highly scalable architecture for a storage
system built on blockchain technology that requires strong data integrity.
In addition, we identified three specific research questions, RQ1, RQ2 and
RQ3 which we addressed in this thesis.
During the course of this project a deep study of literature surrounding
blockchains was undertaken. On the basis of this study we were able to
identify and classify the desired characteristics of a storage system built on
blockchain technology. A design for a scalable architecture was presented,
and we found five basic operations needed to operate the system. By or-
ganizing the architecture into three distinct components, we were able to
separate the agreement protocol from the storage servers [43, 44]. This in
turn allowed for reduced redundancy of the storage servers, which is highly
desirable in an economic sense.
We were able to answer research questions RQ1 and RQ3 by finding
that by using a permissioned blockchain and controlling membership the
need for resistance against Sybil attacks is alleviated. This allows for the
usage of more traditional BFT consensus algorithms which can offer higher
update and query rates, and instantaneous transaction confirmation, without
sacrificing integrity. The drawback is that the number of writers does not
scale well as communication overhead becomes crippling [53, 12]. In addition,
permissioned blockchains needs to have a way of reconfiguring membership.
A prototype based on the system architecture was implemented. The
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prototype is only the first implementation of the architecture, and there is
still considerable work to be done. This includes architectural changes, added
functionality, formal proofs and performance optimizations. By running ex-
periments on the prototype, we were able to empirically confirm the number
of ledger and storage nodes supported, and thus answer research question
RQ2. Further work remains to more accurately determine upper limits for
ledger and storage nodes, and indeed the upper limit for clients in the peer-
to-peer network.
The prototype was built upon the existing open-source blockchain archi-
tecture, Tendermint [30], and the distributed file system, IPFS [28]. Both of
these projects are under continuous development, and especially in the case of
Tendermint, the development cycle may include breaking changes [31]. Due
to this, using the latest version proved a futile effort, and specific release
branches were used instead.
On a positive note, during the course of the project my learning outcome
was great as I was able to learn a great deal about the state of the art of
blockchain systems and several related technologies.
Appendix A
Program Code
The full program code for the prototype is attached to this thesis. In the at-
tachment an installation guide can be found in README.md. There is also






This appendix contains the complete experimental data obtained from the
experiments conducted in Chapter 6. For each of the 9 experiment configu-
rations, 20 measurements were taken.
Times for data dissemination (s)
Storage nodes Mean SD Min Max Median SE
Block commit 0.94 0.10 0.80 1.10 0.90 0.02
1 1.84 0.35 0.80 2.10 1.90 0.08
2 17.84 22.03 1.80 63.90 4.95 4.93
3 34.99 59.19 1.80 246.90 11.60 13.24
Table B.1: Results for data dissemination of a 10 MB file in a small network
consisting of 7 ledger nodes and 3 storage nodes. Unit in seconds.
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Times for data dissemination (s)
Storage nodes Mean SD Min Max Median SE
Block commit 7.10 0.14 6.90 7.40 7.10 0.03
1 8.91 3.84 7.10 25.20 8.10 0.86
2 37.71 27.70 21.10 130.10 29.15 6.19
3 47.50 28.01 26.90 130.10 37.10 6.26
Table B.2: Results for data dissemination of a 100 MB file in a small network
consisting of 7 ledger nodes and 3 storage nodes. Unit in seconds.
Times for data dissemination (s)
Storage nodes Mean SD Min Max Median SE
Block commit 24.17 0.28 23.80 24.70 24.15 0.06
1 26.37 2.35 24.80 32.60 25.40 0.53
2 180.67 88.45 109.30 403.70 153.15 19.78
3 240.72 161.40 129.20 801.80 178.65 36.09
Table B.3: Results for data dissemination of a 500 MB file in a small network
consisting of 7 ledger nodes and 3 storage nodes. Unit in seconds.
Times for data dissemination (s)
Storage nodes Mean SD Min Max Median SE
Block commit 1.02 0.15 0.80 1.30 1.00 0.03
1 2.02 0.15 1.80 2.30 2.00 0.03
2 16.32 22.46 1.90 75.80 5.35 5.02
3 18.37 22.13 2.90 76.80 8.45 4.95
4 26.32 37.61 2.90 163.20 12.95 8.41
5 29.92 42.96 2.90 164.20 13.95 9.60
6 32.92 47.20 2.90 182.20 16.45 10.55
7 36.12 53.69 2.90 189.20 16.45 12.01
8 66.17 139.72 2.90 497.20 21.00 31.24
9 88.42 190.80 2.90 653.20 23.50 42.66
Table B.4: Results for data dissemination of a 10 MB file in a medium
network consisting of 16 ledger nodes and 9 storage nodes. Unit in seconds.
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Times for data dissemination (s)
Storage nodes Mean SD Min Max Median SE
Block commit 7.17 0.24 6.80 7.50 7.25 0.05
1 9.27 4.91 7.80 30.10 8.30 1.10
2 39.57 24.64 21.30 116.10 29.70 5.51
3 46.12 24.42 22.30 116.10 36.80 5.46
4 56.27 27.11 31.40 118.10 42.30 6.06
5 61.42 28.51 33.80 121.10 50.00 6.38
6 66.22 32.15 33.80 130.20 51.40 7.19
7 74.62 35.21 33.80 140.20 61.70 7.87
8 84.77 42.84 34.80 163.80 64.70 9.58
9 102.12 52.97 47.30 205.10 79.60 11.85
Table B.5: Results for data dissemination of a 100 MB file in a medium
network consisting of 16 ledger nodes and 9 storage nodes. Unit in seconds.
Times for data dissemination (s)
Storage nodes Mean SD Min Max Median SE
Block commit 24.20 0.29 23.80 24.70 24.15 0.06
1 25.85 1.75 24.80 32.30 25.35 0.39
2 165.75 42.04 108.10 240.80 145.80 9.40
3 216.65 55.93 137.30 331.20 198.90 12.51
4 262.05 101.93 165.30 489.10 214.90 22.79
5 287.65 105.99 180.30 533.10 265.95 23.70
6 304.75 112.27 190.30 560.10 266.45 25.10
7 331.30 125.45 200.10 598.10 284.70 28.05
8 359.05 136.59 207.10 644.10 295.50 30.54
9 378.50 146.51 222.10 664.10 310.00 32.76
Table B.6: Results for data dissemination of a 500 MB file in a medium
network consisting of 16 ledger nodes and 9 storage nodes. Unit in seconds.
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Times for data dissemination (s)
Storage nodes Mean SD Min Max Median SE
Block commit 1.08 0.18 0.80 1.40 1.05 0.04
1 2.28 0.51 1.80 3.30 2.15 0.11
2 12.98 19.37 2.20 80.20 5.05 4.33
3 14.33 19.09 2.90 80.20 7.45 4.27
4 19.28 21.80 3.90 83.20 10.60 4.87
5 21.13 24.86 3.90 102.20 13.35 5.56
6 25.43 33.21 3.90 131.20 14.35 7.43
7 26.83 34.24 3.90 134.20 15.35 7.66
8 28.63 37.55 3.90 142.20 15.60 8.40
9 29.88 38.64 3.90 142.20 16.35 8.64
10 32.28 42.76 3.90 157.20 17.45 9.56
11 41.08 65.92 3.90 252.20 18.95 14.74
12 46.58 66.07 4.90 255.20 20.85 14.77
13 55.88 76.34 7.90 321.20 29.00 17.07
14 88.08 133.75 9.90 588.20 38.90 29.91
15 141.88 219.68 10.90 951.20 51.55 49.12
Table B.7: Results for data dissemination of a 10 MB file in a large network
consisting of 25 ledger nodes and 15 storage nodes. Unit in seconds.
APPENDIX B. COMPLETE EXPERIMENTAL DATA 90
Times for data dissemination (s)
Storage nodes Mean SD Min Max Median SE
Block commit 7.31 0.26 6.90 7.90 7.20 0.06
1 8.41 0.48 7.90 9.50 8.20 0.11
2 66.46 22.47 25.60 105.40 64.60 5.02
3 70.26 23.28 28.60 107.20 62.80 5.20
4 75.36 22.63 32.60 108.20 69.85 5.06
5 83.36 19.79 48.60 111.40 83.70 4.42
6 90.96 16.71 54.90 117.20 89.25 3.74
7 95.11 17.39 55.90 121.20 97.30 3.89
8 98.66 19.17 56.90 137.20 99.30 4.29
9 102.71 20.95 56.90 141.20 102.05 4.68
10 109.61 23.59 57.90 151.20 110.05 5.28
11 119.06 28.56 57.90 166.00 117.40 6.39
12 129.51 33.56 62.90 199.00 130.10 7.50
13 142.51 37.99 76.90 242.00 141.65 8.49
14 150.51 40.39 81.90 261.00 147.15 9.03
15 169.86 43.38 90.90 280.00 166.65 9.70
Table B.8: Results for data dissemination of a 100 MB file in a large network
consisting of 25 ledger nodes and 15 storage nodes. Unit in seconds.
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Times for data dissemination (s)
Storage nodes Mean SD Min Max Median SE
Block commit 24.38 0.29 23.90 24.90 24.40 0.06
1 27.53 3.39 25.00 33.80 25.70 0.76
2 137.63 47.36 32.50 217.90 142.70 10.59
3 191.13 55.00 82.50 301.90 207.85 12.30
4 223.38 34.64 153.50 306.90 223.45 7.75
5 231.53 31.37 175.50 308.90 229.80 7.01
6 247.83 30.68 193.50 323.20 244.20 6.86
7 262.48 33.08 197.50 329.90 255.40 7.40
8 277.23 34.47 218.50 341.20 276.90 7.71
9 287.38 34.32 232.50 357.20 290.15 7.67
10 298.33 38.83 236.50 363.20 298.95 8.68
11 330.33 48.47 252.40 401.40 314.00 10.84
12 377.98 77.16 260.40 521.10 389.85 17.25
13 458.13 78.50 313.50 591.40 448.70 17.55
14 499.78 70.56 388.00 621.40 515.00 15.78
15 521.33 78.82 390.00 667.50 525.65 17.62
Table B.9: Results for data dissemination of a 500 MB file in a large network
consisting of 25 ledger nodes and 15 storage nodes. Unit in seconds.
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